Treaty Number Four

“The Qu’Appelle Treaty”

The Cree, Saulteaux, and Assiniboine had initial recorded contact with Europeans through the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), which established its first post in 1670. Over the course of 200 years of fur trading, these First Nations evolved into a well armed and territorially aggressive alliance, known as the “Iron Nations” because of their adoption of iron technology. In 1857 the Hind Expedition arrived from Canada to assess the potential for agriculture and settlement of the west. Negotiations were successfully concluded with the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1869 to end its trade monopoly in return for £300,000 plus 1/20 of the land in the “fertile belt.” Under the British Royal Proclamation of 1763, Canada was obligated to enter into treaties with the First Nations prior to any occupation of land.

Treaty Four ceded 195,000 square kilometers of territory ranging from the south-east corner of present day Alberta, most of southern Saskatchewan to west central Manitoba. On September 8, 1874, Canada sent Lieutenant of the North-West Territory Hon. Alexander Morris, Minister of the Interior David Laird, and retired HBC factor William Christie, with an escort of 105 militia, to Fort Qu’Appelle to commence negotiations.

Treaty 4 Negotiations

The Saulteaux, aware of the dissatisfaction of their tribal kin from treaties one, two, and three, were hesitant to enter into negotiations. On the other hand, the Plains Cree led by Loud Voice had indicated their willingness to hear the Commissioners. Charles Pratt, a Cree preacher, served as official translator. While approximately 2,000 had gathered, this represented less than half of the First Nations of the area; the Assiniboine, who were in the midst of hunting buffalo, were not present at all. With Treaty Four being the first major treaty to be negotiated in the North West Territories, the First Nations elected to confront the Crown over the large settlement in money and land that had been given to the Hudson’s Bay Company. On September 8, 1874, the first day of talks, the First Nations indicated that they were not yet sufficiently prepared to meet with the Commissioners. On the second day, Saulteaux spokesman “The Gambler” expressed disappointment that the Commissioners were not camped with the First Nations and questioned why they chose to stay at the Hudson’s Bay Company post.

The First Nations requested more time to meet amongst themselves. By the third day, the Saulteaux sent a request to have the meeting moved to their camp, but this idea was rejected. The Saulteaux, who were the more numerous, tried to prevent the Cree from attending the meeting—at one point taking the threatening to cut down the tent of one of their chiefs. This prompted the Cree to ask for assistance of the militia to maintain peace. Tensions were high as the First Nations debated how to approach the issues that would have such momentous consequences for their future. Lead Crown negotiator Alexander Morris decided to proceed with an address to the Cree during which he outlined the Queen’s promises of “bounty and benevolence” including reserves, agricultural provisions, schools, and annuities.

Morris frequently mentioned concern about the well-being of children and the unborn, and the treaty, he promised, would last “as long as the sun shines and water flows.” The Commissioner increased pressure by claiming he could not stay long. On the fourth day, the Commissioners agreed to move the meeting tent halfway between the HBC post because the First Nations did not feel free to speak out on the Company’s property. Grievances about the HBC were again raised by The Gambler who claimed: “The Company have stolen our land.”

Morris countered that the Crown had paid compensation to end the Company’s trading monopoly. This explanation was still not satisfactory, prompting influential Chief Pasqua to demand: “We want that money.” On the fifth day, Commissioner Morris requested the response of the First Nations. The Saulteaux continued to demand that the activities of the HBC be restricted, something that Morris replied he did not have power to do. As the talks began to fall apart, Loud Voice asked for more to unite the Cree and Saulteaux. The leader of the Saulteaux, Chief Cote, indicated that he wanted to leave. After Morris cautioned that it would be a long time before another treaty offer would be made, Cote agreed to stay another day. On the following and final day, Cree leader Loud Voice began by stating he thought a treaty would be a good thing. Another spokesman, Kamooses, sought reassurances that the Queen’s intentions were good and that “my child will not be troubled for what you are bringing him.” After receiving this assurance, Kamooses, speaking on behalf of the assembly, stated that they were willing to accept the same terms as Treaty Three. That afternoon, thirteen chiefs placed their “x” on the treaty.

Treaty 4 Signatories—September 15, 1874

Written Treaty Terms

• Reserves of 1 square mile per every 5 persons
• Annuities of $25 for chief, plus coat and medal
• Headman $15 annuity
• Each individual $5 annuity
• Chief’s suit of clothing every three years
• Blankets, calicoes, and British flag (once)
• Powder, shot, and twine annually $750
• Per family: 2 hoes, spade, scythe, axe, seed
• Per ten families: 1 plough, 2 harrows
• For chief: oxen, bull, 4 cows, carpenter’s tools, 5 hand saws, 5 augers, crosscut saw, pit saw, and grindstone
• School on reserve
• No liquor allowed
• Hunting, fishing, & trapping

The Treaty Four Monument

Unknown Photographer, Treaty No. 4 Monument at Fort Qu’Appelle

Photographe Inconnu, Monument du traité No 4 à Fort Qu’Appelle

This monument is located at the actual site of the original treaty signing. Unveiled in November 1915, it is a single granite obelisk with plaques listing the names of participants. Interestingly, Edmund Morris’s idea that a sacred carved stone be incorporated was not included in the design.

Chief Pasqua c. 1874
(courtesy Treaty Four Archives)

Chef Pasqua vers 1874
(Gracieusement fournie par les archives du traité n° 4)

After The Treaty

A year after the treaty was signed, confusion reigned as to whether the 1874 treaty was valid. Twice as many First Nations people had appeared in 1875 than had been expected, and many of them did not believe a treaty had been finalized. Chief Piapot pressed to expand treaty terms to include farm instruction, machinery, gristmill, medicines, stores, and blacksmiths. Indians delayed taking annuities for four days in a futile attempt to further these demands. Implementation of the treaty was very slow. Ottawa believed that the First Nations would continue to survive by hunting the buffalo for another decade. The chiefs expected agricultural help immediately and were disappointed when told that the treaty stated they had to first be settled on their reserves. In 1876, surveyor Wagner began laying out reserves for Gordon, Pasqua, Kawacatoose, Day Star and Sakimay.

In 1876, Indian Agent Allan Macdonald was hired to distribute annuities, assist the First Nations in moving to their reserves, and to help teach them agricultural practices. That year, Sitting Bull led almost 5,000 followers to Canada following the Battle of Little Big Horn in Montana. By 1877 the first grain and vegetable seeds arrived and some hoes, spades, and pitchforks were distributed. Ironically, the tools were branded ID (property of the Indian Department)—they were owned by the government and not by the First Nations who were receiving them under the treaty. Permission to use them had to be sought from the Agent. Because of delays in Ottawa, few implements were distributed in 1878 and little was accomplished in farming that year. Agent Macdonald complained that the federal government did not appreciate the difficulties of working over such a vast territory with poor transportation and little support. By 1879 the buffalo had vanished from the prairies—earlier than the government had expected. The failure of crops (due to adverse growing conditions such as early frost, drought, and insects) resulted in starvation. First Nations were reduced to begging for provisions from the Hudson’s Bay Company and were beginning to feel desperation. Meanwhile, government officials in Ottawa tended to blame the problems on tribal culture which they claimed discouraged individual effort.

In 1885, the North West Resistance erupted over Metis grievances. With the federal government’s efforts to gain control, it introduced repressive policies to confine First Nations to reserves, and move their children to residential schools where they would lose contact with their families while being indoctrinated in European culture. On reserves, the detribalization policy undermined traditional political and religious practices through the banning of ceremonies. These steps to aggressively assimilate First Nations broke treaty promises that their culture and freedom would not be taken away.

Photo of Indian ploughing with oxen
Sessional Papers, 1903

Photo d’un Indien qui laboure avec boeufs
Documents Sessional, 1903

Ultimately agriculture, touted as the primary economic salvation for First Nations under the treaty, would fail—due to tight controls by Indian affairs over who could farm, what tools they could purchase, what they could produce, and what they could sell. Hayter Reed, Indian Commissioner from 1883 to 1897, believed that Indians must proceed up the evolutionary ladder—by going from being hunters to being peasants (which entailed the use of hard manual labour on small plots of land). Indians were forbidden from purchasing time-saving equipment, a move that generally doomed crops to destruction from frost. Indians could not sell produce without a permit, a move calculated to reduce competition with settlers on the commercial market.

Qu’Appelle Residential School

The Qu’Appelle School, established in 1884, was among the first four such institutions established by the federal government. The purpose of such residential schools was to remove the child from their parents and indoctrinate them in white culture. Sir John A. Macdonald, Prime Minister and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, explained in Parliament the rationale for the schools: “the child lives with his parents, who are savages. . . . the children should be withdrawn as much as possible from the parental influence, and the only way to do that would be to put them in central training industrial schools where they will acquire the habits and modes of thought of white men.” However, there was soon disillusionment on all sides about the residential schools. The droves of graduates, whom it was predicted would gladly turn their backs on their reserves and assimilate into white society, did not materialize.

Lebret and Industrial School

Lebret et l’École technique

The schools became increasingly expensive, even after their administration was turned over to the Roman Catholic Church and those of other denominations. The government agreed that, in order to save costs, students would do much of the work. Therefore, the “half-day system” emerged in which students performed a number of chores—from gardening and cattle-tending to floor-cleaning, cooking, and mending. With children pining away for their parents, poorly qualified teachers, and unsanitary conditions (due to overcrowding), the schools became recipes for disaster. Indian Affairs admitted that probably fewer than half the students survived to benefit from their education because of the high mortality rate.

The idea of regimentation, discipline, and obedience was strongly emphasized, since the lack of such qualities was seen as a major reason why Indian culture was inferior (Source: Canada, Sessional Papers).

—Blair Stonechild